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Today, the use of Internet of Things (IoT) devices is higher than ever and it is growing
rapidly. Many IoT devices are usually manufactured by home appliance manufacturers where security and privacy are not the foremost concern. When an IoT device is
connected to a network, currently there does not exist a strict authentication method
that verifies the identity of the device, allowing any rogue IoT device to authenticate
to an access point. This thesis addresses the issue by introducing methods for continuous and re-authentication of static and dynamic IoT devices, respectively. We
introduce mechanisms and protocols for authenticating a device in a network through
leveraging Machine Learning (ML) to classify not only if the device is IoT or not but
also the type of IoT device attempting to connect to the network with an accuracy of
over 95%. Furthermore, we compare different types of machine learning classifiers to
best estimate the types of IoT devices and use them to develop a stricter and more
efficient method of authentication.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

The Internet of Things (IoTs) stems from the idea of interconnecting most contemporary devices in the network. Many of these devices are wirelessly connected to
facilitate the deployment process. Recently, there has been an explosion of embedding wireless capabilities in several devices, which is expected to reach 42 billion
devices worldwide by 2025 [17]. Network connected devices include devices such as
internet-enabled appliances, medical devices, smart locks, wearables, home monitoring sensors, cameras, industrial sensors and actuators, and many more [3, 19, 13].
These devices collect a large amount of sensitive information about the user’s whereabouts, health, behavior, and environment [13]. They are also responsible to perform
tasks that are safety-critical, such as safe flying of UAVs, automatically regulating
one’s heart rate and delivering drugs, controlling entry to one’s residence, controlling
gas and electric appliances, etc. [13]. For example, a smart garage door provides access to the house premises, a remotely programmed pacemaker controls the electrical
pulses applied to the heart [42, 13], and a smart insulin pumps continuously monitor
and adjust insulin delivered to diabetic patients [18, 13].

The security of these devices is prone to two significant vulnerabilities; first, the
insecurities and vulnerabilities in the firmware and second, the secrets utilized to
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bootstrap security are prone to compromise. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database of vulnerabilities alone consists of over 900 records related
to the keyword “IoT” depicting the vulnerabilities of firmware [10]. Furthermore,
the compromised secrets can be utilized by an unauthorized party to inject/modify
sensitive data [5, 38, 8, 15, 11]. Therefore, both vulnerabilities compromise the security of the whole network. One of the available ways to address this issue is to use
a policy-based access control to prevent insecure devices from taking control of the
home network [23]. However, the state-of-the-art requires manual configuration of
the policies and is not capable of automatically distinguishing device capabilities to
enforce the policy.

1.1

Motivation

Previous work includes several attempts to improve the authentication process of an
IoT device with a network. Different approaches include authentication based on the
proximity of the IoT device, while others provide methods of authentication through
machine learning by predicting if a device is IoT or not IoT, or by predicting the class
of an IoT device such as cameras, hubs, electronics. However, none of the previous
state-of-the-art solutions such as proximity-based solutions provide an extensive protocol or methods that are completely independent of any interaction by the user after
the initial authentication or machine learning-based solutions where the protocol is
independent of vulnerable network characteristics such as the MAC address and a
protocol that identifies the type of IoT device with high accuracy and provides a
complete and efficient solution that can be used in the real-world.

To advance the previous work done to improve the authentication of an IoT device
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in a network, the goal of this thesis is to propose a protocol that introduces the
following key-important features that have not yet been addressed in any of the
previous state-of-the-art solutions;
• The scenario of credential compromise has not been addressed in previous work.
The effect of the compromise can be reduced by minimizing the user interaction
after initial password authentication of the IoT device with the access point.
One way to achieve this is to automate the IoT authentication process through
the use of machine learning.
• Several existing machine learning models do not classify the type of IoT device;
therefore, the machine learning models should be able not only to classify a
device as IoT or not IoT, but also to classify the type of IoT device that attempts
to authenticate with the network with high accuracy.
• If the primary machine learning model cannot classify a device with high accuracy, the protocol should take further steps to provide a classification using
backup machine learning methods.
• The proposed protocol should consume the least amount of time and memory
for each authentication instance and should not depend on the vulnerable characteristics of the device or the network, such as MAC addresses, which can
easily be spoofed.

1.2

Contribution

The proposed technique utilizes cross-layer data including network, data link, transport, and application to perform the device type level classification. The intuition is
to fingerprint the IoT device behavior and prevent them from having advanced access
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available to non IoT devices such as computers and smartphones. However, this still
leaves vulnerable IoT devices as the weak link to the network. Such as in a home
network, it would not prevent monitoring IoT devices such as a camera to perform
actuation such as opening a garage door. The deployed policy will give the same level
of capabilities to all IoT devices.

Figure 1.1: Thesis Overview
In this thesis, we address the case where a vulnerable IoT device can be compromised by an adversary, where it can be manipulated to 1. capture network traffic,
2. poison the network by uploading malicious packets and, 3. actuate a device to
perform activities of some other type of device, such as allowing a smart camera to
operate as a garage door opener, as shown in Fig. 1.1 showing the overview of the
setup.

Thus, to tackle this problem, we propose using the existing deployment of the
device type policy [23] with an ML-based device type classification to limit network
access according to device capabilities. In contrast to existing work, we propose a
novel technique to perform device-type classification and re- and continuous authen-
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tication of the devices accordingly. RADTEC - Re- and continuous Authentication
based on Device TypE Classification utilizes cross-layer data (network, data link,
transport, and application) to perform classification into six categories: Home Assistant, Smart Camera, Smart Electrical and Lighting, Smart Sensor, and Non-IoT
devices. The re- and continuous authentication is based on the credentials presented
by a device match the device type in the database. This prevents any adversary from
compromising the preloaded secret of a monitoring device and from being able to
actuate devices on the network. The main contribution of our work is as follows:
• We present a device type-based re- and continuous authentication protocol. The
protocol is capable of preventing any adversary with a compromised secret from
imitating more advanced devices.
• We perform extensive theoretical security analysis to prove the security of the
proposed technique against an advanced adversary capable of compromising
weak IoT devices.
• We perform extensive experimentation by utilizing the available data [37] for
our ML-based device type classification technique to show the performance of
various classifiers based on algorithms including Random Forest [32], K-Nearest
Neighbors [30], Support Vector Machine [33], Gradient Boosting [29], and Gaussian Naive Bayes [31]. We also show that the Random Forest Classifier [32] is
the most efficient in performing accurate classifications.
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Chapter 2

Background and Related Work

The problem of developing a strict authentication protocol for IoT devices has recently been tackled, where some researchers have proposed machine learning-based
techniques to differentiate several types of IoT devices from non-IoT devices, while
others have proposed proximity-based solutions. In this section, we discuss the work
done by several researchers in the related area. We then describe the outcomes and
limitations of their work.

2.1

Machine Learning Based Authentication

In recent work, the authors have provided a system capable of automatically identifying the type of IoT device through the use of machine learning (ML) and limiting the
communication of vulnerable devices to minimize damage inflicted on the network
[24]. However, the protocol relies on MAC addresses to identify a new device trying to authenticate with the network, which can be spoofed. Furthermore, the work
does not consider the case where a previously authenticated device is compromised
or a re-authentication process for every time the device is reintroduced into the network. Bremler et al. focus on distinguishing between IoT a Non-IoT (NoT) devices
through the use of ML classifiers to assign relevant security policies to the device [7].
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However, among several drawbacks, the biggest limitation is demonstrated by their
classification technique since their classification model is only capable of classifying
a device as IoT or not-IoT. Not addressing this issue would allow the adversary to
compromise a vulnerable device to actuate activities that should only be performed
by a different kind of device, for example, using a vulnerable smart camera to open
a lock or a garage door. In another work, the authors aim to automatically detect
suspicious IoT devices in a network through the Random Forest classifier and white
list devices that are classified as trustworthy [22]. The drawback of this approach is
that if a vulnerable device that has already been whitelisted is compromised by an
adversary, it would give the adversary unrestricted access to the network, since the
network is not capable of identifying the change in device behavior. In other work,
the authors propose IoT security solutions based on ML techniques, including reinforcement learning, unsupervised learning, and supervised learning to improve IoT
systems spoofing resistance and detection and to authenticate a device to protect
data privacy [41]. Their work attempts to detect an attack through several machine
learning techniques; however, each attack is identified through a different machine
learning model, which can end up utilizing a large number of resources such as memory and time. Furthermore, in our opinion, if the models are trained to detect an
attack by observing a certain pattern, the attack in real-life might differ from what
the models are trained to identify which could potentially leave attacks undetected.

A survey related to ML-based classification techniques to detect and identify legitimate and rogue IoT devices to provide security where conventional approaches that
use cryptographic protocols cannot be applied [21]. However, the paper demonstrates
limitations as it does not present a complete and formal authentication protocol that
can incorporate the ML techniques presented in order to protect the network from
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certain attacks in real life. An in-depth survey of different machine learning techniques that can be used in the field of IoT to intelligently monitor the security of
IoT devices to implement certain security measures such as authentication, network
and application security, access control, and encryption is presented in [4]. The work
focuses mainly on detecting attacks by monitoring the behavior of the IoT device;
however, it does not extend machine learning classification techniques to differentiate
between several types of IoT devices.

Finally, for our work, we utilize the data collected by [37]. The authors of the
data present an IoT device type classification method that uses multiple classifiers
trained on different types of quantifiable and textual data such as DNS query content,
port numbers, cipher suite, etc. Finally, they present a combined classifier with an
accuracy over 99%. However, even though they provide a highly accurate model for
classifying the different types of IoT devices, they do not provide a formal authentication protocol that can utilize the proposed classification techniques. Furthermore,
we believe that our approach is more efficient, as it relies only on quantifiable data
to provide a classification.

2.2

Proximity Based Related Work

The state-of-the-art proximity-based solution proposed in [44] is based on several
physical activities performed by a user, such as moving a smartphone towards and
away from an IoT device and rotating the smartphone to authenticate an IoT device.
The work provides a notable contribution in the field of IoT device authentication;
however, it requires a significant amount of work to be performed by the user. Furthermore, the authors only address initial authentication and do not discuss the measures
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that must be taken if an already authenticated vulnerable device is compromised.

In other work, the authors propose a proximity-based user authentication solution
for voice-powered IoT devices [14]. The work presents a voice-based distance estimation technique to authenticate IoT devices using technologies such as Bluetooth,
speakers, and microphone. However, the biggest constraint for the proposed method
is that it is only applicable to voice-powered IoT devices. Shafagh and Hithnawi propose another proximity-based solution for IoT device authentication by solely utilizing
the wireless communication interface [35]. Their method attempts to differentiate a
legitimate request for authentication from an illegitimate one by the use of ambient
radio signals that estimates the proximity of an IoT device. However, their solution
presents limitations, since it does not account for a device in close proximity being
compromised due to its security vulnerabilities, which could lead an adversary to perform attacks such as actuation, poisoning the network, and capturing network traffic.
The techniques used for device identification in [25] only identify if a device has been
compromised and do not provide a formal authentication protocol that can utilize
the proposed solution to authenticate an IoT device before establishing a connection
with the network. Finally, in other work, the authors propose a device identification
based on fingerprint recognition of the wireless device chipset [27]. However, their
solution is not capable of identify a compromised legitimate device.
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Chapter 3

Models and Preliminaries

In this chapter, we first present the system model, which consists of three main
components: legitimate devices, a hub, and a verification server. Next, we discuss
the adversary model, which discusses several possible ways that an adversary can
exploit a vulnerable device to: 1. capture network traffic, 2. poison the network by
injecting malicious packets, and 3. actuate a device to perform activities of some other
type of device. Furthermore, we present the security requirements of the RADTEC
protocol to authenticate devices based on device-type classification, and finally, we
give a brief overview of the machine learning techniques and algorithms we employ
in this thesis.

3.1

System Model

The system model identified for this work is similar to a network containing IoT devices. The main components of the system are shown in Fig. 3.1, which are:

Legitimate devices (D): Legitimate devices have already established trust with
the network using any existing technique [40, 39, 12]. There is no limitation to the
security requirement and capabilities of the devices.
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Figure 3.1: System Model

Hub (A): The hub is responsible for serving legitimate devices. The hub also
performs initial trust establishment and verification of existing credentials. The hub
provides the connection between the devices and the Internet and is able to see the
headers of various layers.

Verification Server (V ): The verification server is responsible for performing device
type classifications based on the traffic pattern. The verification server is accessed
by the hub as a cloud service. The hub collects the traffic pattern and transmits it
to the verification server to receive the classification. A and V are assumed to have
a trusted communication channel. This channel can be realized using any contemporary cryptographic technique so that an authenticated encryption AE K(·) can be
implemented [6].
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3.2

Adversary Model

The adversary (M ) is capable of compromising any of the legitimate devices by any
method such as but not limited to exploiting the firmware vulnerabilities, or database
compromise of pre-shared secrets [20, 26]. The adversary can utilize compromised
knowledge to hijack a vulnerable device in the network as an attempt to,
• Poison the network by injecting malicious packets,
• Capture network traffic to extract sensitive data,
• Actuate a device to perform activities of some other type of device.
We assume that the adversary has no prior knowledge of the traffic pattern of any
compromised legitimate device. This is a reasonable assumption because the adversary, when learning the compromised secrets, does not have access to the legitimate
device to capture and perform traffic pattern analysis.

3.3

Security Requirement

The security requirement of RADTEC is to authenticate devices based on the classification of the device type. The hub is responsible for the verification of the credentials
and for the comparison of claimed and observed device types based on the traffic
pattern. The hub and the verification server can be assumed to be a single entity as
a secured gateway. The secured gateway performs: 1) initial trust establishment, 2)
policy-based network access, and 3) re- and continuous and authentication of devices.

The first can be achieved using any of the existing methods [40, 39, 12]. The assumption here is that, after the initial user-initiated trust establishment, each device
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is assigned independent credentials. This is already present in existing technologies
such as WiFi Protected Setup (WPS), where device-specific Pre-Shared Keys (PSK)
are assigned for WPA2 or WPA 3 [39]. These keys can be utilized for any subsequent
authentication or to build future security properties of integrity verification or confidentiality.

For the second, the network can implement levels of network access based on
known vulnerabilities of a device type [24]. To implement these policies on a microlevel, we developed a classification technique that can distinguish between various
types of IoT devices. The known vulnerabilities of these device types can be extracted
from a vulnerability database such as the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
(CVE) [10] and utilized to tailor the policies.

Finally, the intuition behind the third is to provide an additional modality during
the re- and continuous authentication phase. In addition to the credentials, the
behavior of the device should match previously known behavior. The secured gateway
saves the traffic fingerprints with the credentials and utilizes them as parameters
for during re-authentication. Therefore, an adversarial device now not only has to
compromise credentials, but also mimics the known traffic pattern of the compromised
device to authenticate with the network.

3.4

Preliminaries - Machine Learning Models

In this section, we describe supervised learning and five different types of supervised
machine learning algorithms used to classify the type of IoT device in the network.
These algorithms include the Random Forest Classifier, K-Nearest Neighbors, Sup-
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port Vector Machine Classifier, Gradient Boost Classifier, and Naive Bayes Classifier.

3.4.1

Supervised Learning (SL)

Supervised Learning is a sub-category of machine learning where the learning of an
algorithm is supervised. This essentially means that the algorithm is taught by using
examples. As shown in Fig.3.2, the data collected is first labeled into its respective
categories by a supervisor. This data is then pre-processed and split into train and
test datasets. The algorithm uses training data that consist of labeled input data for
training, where it searches for patterns and then correlates each data point with its
respective label. Then, for prediction, the unsupervised machine learning algorithms
take the unseen test data and attempt to make a determination of its label by using
patterns learned during the training process.

Figure 3.2: Supervised Learning

3.4.2

Random Forest Classifier

The Random Forest Classifier is based on a decision tree like structure at its core,
and it can be categorized as an ensemble-based learning method used for making
classifications. The algorithm is called ensemble-based because it makes a prediction
using an ensemble of large amounts of different and completely uncorrelated decision
trees. The final result is based on the predictions made by each individual decision
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tree where the class with the majority of votes is the models final prediction.

Figure 3.3: Random Forest Classifier

3.4.3

K-Nearest Neighbors Classifier

The K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) classifier is a supervised machine learning algorithm,
mostly used for solving classification problems. The algorithm works by estimating
the test data point in a group, based on its nearest “K” number of neighbors. Furthermore, the algorithm does not require any training; instead, it stores the training
dataset and considers the training data points as neighbors of each test data point
during the classification process. For example, if K=5, the algorithm will look at the
five nearest neighbors (from the training data set) of the test data point, and if three
out of five neighbors belong to class A and two out of five belong to class B, the final
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classification of the test data point will be class A.

Figure 3.4: K-Nearest Neighbors Classifier

3.4.4

Gradient Boosting Classifier

The Gradient Boosting Classifier is a supervised machine learning algorithm based on
the ensemble technique, which means that it utilizes the predictions made by several
different weak decision trees to give a strong final prediction. The gradient boosting
algorithm uses an additive approach to build the model by typically adding several
decision trees sequentially, where in each iteration, the successor tree utilized the results generated by its predecessor tree to reduce error. The processes, also shown in
Fig.3.5, effectively reduces the error over several iterations, which helps the algorithm
to provide its final predictions.
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Figure 3.5: Gradient Boosting Classifier
3.4.5

Support Vector Machine Classifier

The Support Vector Machine Classifier is a supervised machine learning algorithm,
mostly used for solving classification problems. The algorithm plots all data points
with an ‘n’ number of features in an n-dimensional space, and the coordinate value
of each data point is the value of the feature. Finally, classification is performed by
finding hyperplanes that differentiates the multiple classes, and if a test data point
can be placed within a certain hyperplane, it will share the same class with the data
points in its neighborhood.
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Figure 3.6: Support Vector Machine Classifier
3.4.6

Gaussian Naive Bayes Classifier

The Gaussian Naive Bayes Classifier is often used for classification jobs where the
values of all features are continuous and distributed in a Gaussian distribution. The
algorithm is called naive because it implies that the presence of any feature is completely independent of the existence of any other feature. It is based on the Bayes
theorem (Eq.3.1) which helps define the probability of the occurrence of hypothesis
A after the data B, is already given.

P (A|B) =

P (B|A)P (A)
P (B)

(3.1)

19

Chapter 4

Protocol

In this section, we present RADTEC - Re- and Continuous Authentication based on
Device TypE Classification. The main idea is to first perform device type classification based on traffic pattern. Then utilizing the device type to perform additional
verification during the authentication process. Before diving into the protocol, we
present the machine learning-based device type classification technique. For devicetype classification, we first generate the fingerprint using features embedded in the
packet and use them to perform device-type classification.

4.1

Device Fingerprint Generation

The traffic from the legitimate device (D) is collected by the hub (A). The hub utilizes
the unique characteristics in the headers of different layers to collect device fingerprint. We chose to utilize the header as they are not encrypted and A does not have
access to the keys shared between D and cloud services. For generating the fingerprint, we propose using the n number of packets {pD (1), pD (2), . . . , pD (n)} for each
device D. For our work, we utilize the data collected by [37]. Initially, we extracted
19 characteristics from each packet, which we define as the feature f (i, j). However,
we chose to consider only the important features as removing unnecessary features
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would improve efficiency in a real world scenario by reducing the time required for
model training and classification and the required memory. Therefore, we calculate
the importance scores for the features by utilizing the results provided by making
predictions using a basic random forest classifier. We chose seven out of 19 features
for which the importance score is greater than 0.05, as shown in Table 4.1. We first
selected this threshold by keeping the top five most important scores and considered
more features until the model performance was either unchanged or negatively affected.

Feature

OSI Model Layer

tcp.port
tcp.stream
frame.time delta
ip.len
ip.ttl
tcp.window size
frame.time relative

Transport Layer
Transport Layer
Physical Layer
Network Layer
Network Layer
Transport Layer
Physical Layer

Importance
Score
0.066480
0.094845
0.096504
0.099793
0.102245
0.125575
0.163713

Table 4.1: Features with corresponding importance score.

Now, for a packet pD (i), from D we have seven fingerprint characteristics such as,
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(4.1)
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4.2

Device Type Classification

We perform classification of devices into seven different types: smart camera, smart
sensor, smart home assistant, smart electrical and lighting, smart speaker, and nonIoT. The intuition behind choosing these types are camera and sensors collect information and home assistants can perform actuation. Thus, this will allow efficient
implementation of policies, preventing information gathering devices from actuating.
In addition, we diversify information gathering devices into cameras and sensors as
they collect data with different levels of privacy invasion. The camera gives more
information about user privacy as compared to the sensors.

We improve the efficiency and accuracy of the classification process by implementing a threshold-based iterative classification technique. The collected dataset is first
divided into 80% for training and 20% for testing, then the five different models are
trained by fitting the training data on each model individually.
1. Initialization: After establishing a secure connection with the verifier, the
hub A transmits the fingerprint AE(FD ) to the verification server V, using the
trusted channel.
2. Initial Classifier Evaluation: V selects the initial classifier Cx corresponding
to the hub A. The verifier server V obtains the type TD (i, x) and accuracy
a(i, x). If the accuracy a(i, x) ≥ τ, V transmits AE(TD (i, x)) to A. Otherwise,
V makes table with type and accuracy [TD (i, x); a(i, x)], and sorts it according
to accuracy in descending order.
3. Targeted Classifier Evaluation: V selects three types with highest accuracy
TD (i, x), TD (j, x), and TD (k, x). Further, V evaluates the fingerprint FD using
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Figure 4.1: Verifier
the three classifiers Ci , Cj , and Ck corresponding to the types with highest
accuracy. If any of the accuracy of the classifiers a(y, y) ≥ τ ∀ y = {i, j, k},
V transmits the corresponding type AE(TD (y, y)) to A. Otherwise, repeat the
step.

4.2.1

RADTEC: The Protocol

The re- and continuous authentication protocol can be utilized for both kinds of
device: the devices re-introduced into the network or the devices constantly present
in the network. The intuition is to utilize the cryptographic credentials and observed
device type for authentication of the device. A device (D) that is being reintroduced
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into the network or a constantly present device (D) that refreshes the credentials,
presents the credentials from the previous session to the hub (A). The hub verifies
the validity of the credentials and places the device in limited network access. During
the limited network access period, D is allowed to communicate to the Internet but
not to any other entities on the network. This lets the IoT device communicate with
the online service. During this communication, A captures the traffic transmitted
and received by D. Then A transmits the captured traffic to the verification server
(V ). The server V computes the fingerprint of the device type based on the traffic
and compares the observed fingerprint of the device type with the fingerprint saved
in the database, and finally, returns the classification results to A.. If verification
is successful, D is given full access to the network according to the deployed policy;
otherwise, the device is disconnected and the credentials are marked as compromised.
Here the adversary (M ) can compromise a device and obtain the credential and
attempt to connect to A. However, if the adversary is unaware of the device type
corresponding to compromised credentials, the adversary will be unable to mimic the
traffic pattern and fail the device type verification process. The user will be notified
of the compromise. the legitimate device with compromised credentials will have to
complete the manual initial trust establishment. Formally, the protocol follows the
following steps:
1. Initialization: The user initiates the initial authentication where the device
(D) then transmits the credentials CD := {KD , ID } to the hub A, where KD is
the pre-shared key and ID is the identity of D.
2. Limited Access: After verification of CD , A places D on limited access network. In case of failure, the session is terminated by A.
3. Capture Traffic: The device (D) establishes the connection to the network
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and transmits data to its cloud service. This traffic TD is captured by A for a
pre-determined time.
4. Device Type Classification: AE(TD ) is transmitted by A to the verification
server (V ) on the trusted channel. If the MAC address of the device is unknown,
V executes the classification algorithm on TbD after verifying the integrity and
authenticity of the message. After the device has been successfully verified
through the classification process, the device type fingerprint FD is saved on a
database for future authentication.
5. Device Type Verification: If the MAC address of the device is known and the
device has been previously authenticated or after the device has been successfully classified, V retrieves the stored device type fingerprint FD saved on the
database corresponding to the identity ID . Finally, V performs the verification
?
FbD′ = FD . and sends the results to A.

6. Full Access: If the verification passes D is granted full access to the network
according to any deployed policy. Otherwise the session is rejected by A and
the credential CD is marked compromised.
7. Continuous-authentication: Any IoT device in the network with full-access
can be re-authenticated at least ‘n’ times a day by using Device Type Verification to maintain the security of the network and to identify a compromised
device.
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Chapter 5

Security Analysis

In this section, we analyze the RADTEC protocol and the classification techniques
used in this paper by discussing the key feature that makes the proposed solution
resistant to multiple attacks. Finally, we discuss some additional scenarios where
the protocol can be implemented to provide complete security to the system, which
involves implementing different authentication techniques based on the behavior of
the device.

5.1

Analysis of RADTEC

Initially, a user initiates the authentication of a new device through the use of device
credentials that utilize cryptographic techniques to create the initial connection between a device and the hub. RADTEC is capable of identifying whether a device is
known or unknown through the use of above mentioned classification techniques. The
protocol addresses scenarios where an adversary can: 1. exploit a vulnerable device
to inject malicious packets and therefore, poison the network [16], 2. use a vulnerable
IoT device to extract sensitive data even if the network packets are encrypted [2], 3.
compromise a vulnerable IoT device and actuate the activities that would typically
be performed by a different type of device [43]. We detect such attacks by using the
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classifiers stored in the database as they are trained using the fingerprints of previously authenticated devices. When a machine learning model is asked to make a
prediction of a dataset that is similar to the dataset on which it was trained, it gives
a highly accurate classification. So, the idea here is that if a device is compromised,
the content of the data packets will change, and we can detect those changes by using
the classifiers in the database, since the fingerprint will now not be similar to the one
used to train the model initially.

Finally, once the verifier sends these results back to the hub, the hub will revoke the
full network access and only grant the device limited access to the network. It will further remove the credentials of the compromised device from the list of authenticated
and the device will need to be reintroduced into the network and re-authenticated in
the future. If the device is still compromised during re-authentication, the classifiers
will not be able to provide an accurate classification of the device since the device
fingerprint will still be different. For example, if an IoT camera is compromised, the
classifiers in the verifier will not be able to classify the device as a camera since the
fingerprint collected from the device will not be similar to any IoT camera fingerprint
used to train the classifiers.

5.2

Analysis of the Classification Technique

We take the approach mentioned in this thesis rather than only identifying a new
device based on the MAC address like in [24], where the adversary could easily spoof
the MAC address of an already authenticated device and authenticate itself with the
hub [36]. In our approach, the device is classified every time it needs re-authentication
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irrespective of its previous authentication with the server. The only time we use the
MAC address is to check if the device already exists in the database; so, even if the
MAC address is spoofed, the classifier in the database will not be able to make a classification with the highest accuracy since the fingerprint of the device does not match
with the one already stored in the database, creating a contradiction since the MAC
address is the same but the fingerprint of the device is completely different. This
would address the case where a vulnerable device is compromised since the traffic
pattern and, therefore, the fingerprint of the device will now be different from before.
The verifier will automatically be able to send this confirmation to the hub that the
MAC addresses match, but the fingerprint does not match, so this device must be an
illegitimate device.

This is based on the idea that when a machine learning model is trained and tested
on the same or at least similar dataset, it should provide predictions with the highest
accuracy. That is also the reason why we capture the traffic of a new device, and once
it is authenticated, we train a model solely on the fingerprint of the authenticated
device and store that model in the database.

5.3

Discussion

We assume that there are three scenarios in which a device needs to be re- and continuous authentication. In this section, we present different scenarios in which a device
would need to be authenticated within a network to achieve full access.

When a new device is first introduced in the network, the hub collects the
device fingerprint and network information, such as the MAC address of the IoT de-
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vice, and forwards it to the verifier. The verifier then looks up the MAC address in the
database and realizes that the device has not been previously connected. The device
type-level classifiers along with the targeted classifiers are used to make an accurate
classification of the device, and then, based on the results, the device is granted full
access to the network. The device fingerprint is further used to train a classifier and
store it in a database for future classifications, as explained previously in our protocol.

However, if a previously authenticated device moves in and out of the
network and requires re-authentication, the verifier simply collects the fingerprint of the device and its MAC address and uses it to first confirm whether the
device with the same MAC address has been previously classified. Then the verifier
attempts to make a classification of the device type using the classifier stored in the
database, and, based on the classification results, it notifies the hub to give full or
limited network access to the device.

Finally, if a device that constantly remains inside the network requires
continuous authentication and any device can be continuously authenticated up
to “n” number of times a day. The process of authentication then would be similar
to the re-authentication process.

The protocol addresses all three scenarios by correlating a device MAC address to
the ones previously stored in the database, and then providing authentication by the
use of the classification techniques applied in this paper. Furthermore, if a vulnerable
device is compromised by an adversary and the authentication credentials are stolen,
it will generally be the case that the adversary does not know the type of device.
However, even if the adversary is able to identify the type of device, the adversary
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will not be able to perform any actions using the vulnerable device, since the classification model will notice the change in device fingerprint, resulting in blocking the
access given to the device.

It is important to note here that if a device is compromised, it will not be detected
until the next time the device needs to be re-authenticated and during that time, the
adversary can use the compromised credentials to perform malicious activities. This
is acceptable since the security administrator will be able to control the parameters
for performing multiple re-authentications for a device in a certain amount of time.
This process is similar to the frequency at which the key revocation process operates,
which depends on the security requirements of different devices and networks [9].
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Chapter 6

Implementation

In this section, we discuss the selection of the data set and the process for device
identification. Additionally, we present the implementation techniques used to classify IoT devices such as data preprocessing involving, data cleaning and splitting,
standardizing features, numerical imputation, and feature engineering. Finally, we
discuss the training of the classifiers used to classify the type of IoT devices.

6.1

Dataset

Traffic between all devices listed in the table and the access point was acquired from
data collected at the University of New South Wales [37]. The data collected include
more than 28 IoT devices such as cameras, motion sensors, health monitors, appliances, etc. A subset of data collected over the period of six months has been made
available as open-source. We chose 15 devices as shown in Table 6.1 and obtained
relevant information from packet capture files by extracting important features using
tshark into comma separated value files (.csv). After capturing the “n” packets from
the pcap file and the “f” features using tshark, we built the fingerprint matrix (n×f ).
We further classified the different devices according to the type of device they are and
assigned them a class for the model training and testing process.
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Device Name
Amazon Echo
Netatmo Welcome
Samsung SmartCam
Dropcam
Insteon Camera
Belkin Wemo switch
Light Bulbs LiFX Smart Bulb
Belkin wemo motion sensor
Netatmo weather station
Withings Smart scale
Withings Aura smart sleep sensor
Triby Speaker
Samsung Galaxy Tab
Laptop
iPhone

Category
Smart Home Assistant
Smart Camera
Smart Camera
Smart Camera
Smart Camera
Smart Electric
and Lighting
Smart Electrical
and Lighting
Smart Sensor
Smart Sensor
Smart Sensor
Smart Sensor
Smart Speaker
Non-Iot
Non-Iot
Non-Iot

Class
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
4
4
4
4
5
0
0
0

Table 6.1: List of IoT devices and their classes

6.2

Device Identification

The device identification process is done by utilizing the device fingerprint collected
by the hub. The list of devices mentioned above consists of certain types of devices,
but not all types of IoT devices. However, our process for developing the ML model
is scalable. New categories of IoT devices can simply be trained on the combined
classifier and targeted classifiers through the use of device packet capture.
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6.2.1

Algorithm selection

Based on previous work and approaches [4, 41, 7, 24], we decided to use the following
five classifiers: random forest, k-nearest neighbors, gradient boosting, naı̈ve Bayes,
and support vector machine. However, we improved the previous work that classifies
the IoT device and performs only the IoT or non-IoT classification through higher
accuracy and a more efficient classification process. In our research, we not only
classified whether the device was an IoT device or not, but also performed a further
classification of the type of IoT device such as smart cameras, home assistants, smart
switches and plugs, etc.

6.2.2

Data Pre-processing

For better classification results the data was preprocessed by using several techniques.
Following are the techniques used in this paper,

6.2.2.1

Data Cleaning and Splitting

The pcap files had several data points and characteristics that were not relevant.
Therefore, once the pcap files were converted to csv files, we removed packets with
source ethernet addresses that were not required in our model. This included all outgoing traffic from the access point, since it does not require classification and would
only bias the predictions made by the classifier due to the large amounts of such packets present in the data. The empty columns representing empty values for features
were also removed since they do not provide any contribution to the classification
process. Finally, the entire dataset was labeled in different classes for training and
testing.
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The data in the csv was loaded into a data frame and the labels were separated
out of the data frame splitting the data into X (features) and Y (labels). Then both
X and Y were randomly split into train and test data sets in a ratio of 80% and 20%
respectively.

6.2.2.2

Standardizing Features

Standardizing features is a requirement for many classifiers to achieve high accuracy.
We used the standard sklearn scale method to standardize the features in our dataset,
which subtracts the mean from the values and then scales it to unit variance,

z=

v−m
s

(6.1)

where, v = values of the sample dataset, m = mean of training samples and s =
standard deviation of the training samples

6.2.2.3

Numerical Imputation

We use numerical imputation to assign a value to missing values in any feature. It
is better than removing the entire packet since that would affect the amount of data
needed to make accurate classifications. Therefore, missing values are imputed to the
median values of each individual feature. This process is done by utilizing the fill na
method provided by the pandas data analysis tool.

6.2.2.4

Feature Engineering

First, we use a random forest search classifier to extract feature importance scores
from the 19 features shown in Fig.6.1. After calculating the importance scores for
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the features, we set a threshold of 0.05 for the importance score of the features and
eliminated all features with importance scores below the threshold.

Figure 6.1: Feature Importance Scores
The data that we used to classify the type of IoT devices had several features that
were not useful for making predictions. Such features included tcp.urgent pointer,
ip.flags.mf, tcp.analysis.ack rtt, ip.proto, tcp.time delta, ip.flags.df, tcp.flags, tcp.len,
tcp.ack, udp.port, tcp.time relative, tcp.seq. These features were removed from the
dataset because they did not provide any valuable contribution, negatively affected
the required runtime and memory usage, and reduced the accuracy of the classifiers
used.
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6.3

Training and Testing

After collecting and pre-processing the dataset, 80% of it was used to train each
of these five classifiers individually: Random Forest Classifier (RFC)[32], K-Nearest
Neighbors Classifier (KNN)[30], Support Vector Machine Classifier (SVM)[33], Gradient Boosting Classifier (GBC)[29], and Gaussian Naive Bayes Classifier (GNB)[31].
The training process was performed using the fit method provided by sklearn, which
fits the model onto the data to later provide predictions [28]. During the training
process, the time taken to fully train each model was recorded and is shown in Table
6.2.

During testing, the labels for the test data were predicted by the previously trained
models, and the predicted labels were compared to the actual labels to calculate the
accuracy of the classifications provided by each model. This was done by the use of
accuracy score function provided by the sklearn.metrics library [34]. Finally, the time
required to train each model was calculated and the average time required to classify
a single data point is shown in Table 6.2

Model
Gaussian Naive Bayes Classifier
Random Forest Classifier
K-Nearest Neighbors Classifier
Support Vector Machine Classifier
Gradient Boosting Classifier

Train Time
50 ms
18.17 sec
0.34 sec
110 min
2.9 min

Test Time
0.23 ms
0.63 ms
0.92 ms
3.67 ms
6.89 ms

Table 6.2: Time required for training each model and the average time required to
classify one device.
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Chapter 7

Results

In this chapter, we present the results of the classification algorithms employed in
this thesis to identify the device type-level classification. To achieve the most accurate classification of all the IoT devices, we trained five different models including
Random Forest Classifier (RFC), K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN), Support Vector Machine Classifier (SVM), Gradient Boost Classifier (GBC) and, Gaussian Naive Bayes
(GNB) classifier and then evaluated their performance. The metrics used to analyze
each model performance were the F1 score and the accuracy score.

7.1

F1 Score

The F1 score is an evaluation metric used to determine the performance of a machine
learning classifier and is defined as the harmonic mean of recall and precision. It
gives a better insight about the classification made by each device type classifier as
it not only calculates the number of misclassifications made by the different models
but helps identify the types of mislassifications made.

Precision, also known as the positive predicted value, is the ratio between the
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number of true correct positives and the total number of instances predicted to be
positive and is given by Eq. 7.1.

P recision =

N umber of T rue P ositives
N umber of T rue P ositives + N umber of F alse P ositives

(7.1)

Recall, also known as sensitivity, is the ratio between the correct true positives
and the total sum of the number of false negatives and true positives and is given by
Eq. 7.2.

Recall =

N umber of T rue P ositives
N umber of T rue P ositives + N umber of F alse N egatives

(7.2)

The value of the F1 score can range between 0 and 1 where 1 is the highest score
a model can achieve and the values of both precision and recall are the highest. The
formula for the F1 score is given by Eq. 7.3.

F 1 Score = 2 ×

P recicion × Recall
P recision + Recall

(7.3)

We calculate the F1 score using the evaluation metric library provided by sklearn
.metrics [1]. The F1 score for each class within each model is plotted in the Fig. 7.1
where class 0 represent non-IoT devices, class 1 represents Home Assistants, class 2
represents Smart Camera, class 3 represents Smart Bulb & Smart Electrical, class 4
represents Smart Sensors, and class 5 represents Smart Speaker. The highest average
F1 score for all classes was provided by the Random Forest Classifier (RFC) where
it can further seen that the model is near perfect for differentiating between an IoT
and a non-IoT device.
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Figure 7.1: F1 scores for Random Forest Classifier (RFC), Gradient Boost Classifier
(GBC), K-Nearest Neighbors Classifier (KNN), Support Vector Machine Classifier
(SVM), and Gaussian Naive Bayes Classifier (GNB).

7.2

Accuracy Score

The accuracy score is an evaluation metric used for machine learning models to measure their performance by determining the ratio between the number of correct predic-
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tions made by the classifier and the total number of predictions to be made (Eq. 7.4).
Additionally, the percentage of this score can be calculated to obtain the accuracy of
a classifier in terms of a percentage.

Accuracy Score =

N umber of correct predictions
N umber of total predictions

(7.4)

The function to calculate the accuracy of our machine learning models used to perform
multi-class classification was provided by the sklearn.metrics library [34]. After making the predictions, we established that the Random Forest Classifier (RFC) was the
most accurate model for making predictions with an accuracy of 95.2%. The second
most accurate classifier was the Gradient Boost Classifier (GBC) with an accuracy of
94.8%, then the K-Nearest Neighbors Classifier (KNN) with accuracy 93.3%, Support
Vector Machine Classifier (SVM) with accuracy of 88.3%, and finally the Gaussian
Naive Bayes Classifier (GNB) with accuracy of 76.8%.

Figure 7.2: Accuracy vs Model plot for Confidence Interval
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Furthermore, using the accuracy score, we also determine the 95% confidence
interval for each classifier. The method essentially provides an upper bound and a
lower bound for accuracy, which represents all the possible values accuracy can have.
Therefore, when any device needs classification, there will be a 95% likelihood for it
to be classified will lie between that range and is given by the following equation,
r
95% Conf idence Interval = 1.96 ×

(accuracy × (1 − accuracy))
n

(7.5)

The upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval for each classifier are
shown in the Table7.1 and its plot is shown in Fig.7.2.
Model
Random Forest Classifier
K-Nearest Neighbors Classifier
Support Vector Machine Classifier
Gradient Boosting Classifier
Gaussian Naive Bayes Classifier

CI Upper Bound
0.9527
0.9338
0.8840
0.9487
0.7694

CI Lower Bound
0.9513
0.9322
0.8820
0.9473
0.7666

Table 7.1: Upper bound and lower bound of 95% Confidence Interval (CI)
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Chapter 8

Conclusion and Future Work

In this thesis, we proposed the RADTEC protocol as a solution to improve the security of IoT devices. Through the use of several machine learning and cryptographic
techniques, RADTEC addresses the events in which an adversary can exploit a vulnerable device to: 1. capture network traffic, 2. poison the network by injecting
malicious packets, and 3. actuate a device to perform activities of some other type
of device. We then performed the security analysis of our protocol and presented
the implementation of device type level classification that utilizes cross-layer data,
including network, data link, transport, and application, and it was carried out using
five classifiers, where the performance of each classifier was measured using the accuracy and F1 score evaluation metrics.

We used the Random Forest Classifier, Gradient Boost Classifier, K-NearestNeighbors Classifier, Support Vector Machine Classifier, and the Naive Bayes Classifier to identify whether a device in the network is an IoT device or not, and then
further classified the type of IoT device. Of all models, the Random Forest Classifier
was able to make the most accurate prediction with an accuracy score of 95.2% and
the highest average F1 score. Finally, the time required to train the models and the
average time taken to classify a single data point were recorded for all classifiers.
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Gaussian Naive Bayes Classifier was found to be the fastest classifier for training and
testing; however, we prefer to use the Random Forest Classifier, as it still required less
time than most other models for training and testing and provided the most accurate
results.

8.1

Future Work

While we have provided a solution to improve IoT security, there are other important
issues that still need to be addressed. Therefore, in our future work we plan to
train classification models for several more types of IoT devices. We will also collect
more data and include additional features from the packet capture for each type of
device to provide more accurate classifications. In addition to the machine learning
classifiers used in this thesis, we will perform device type level classification using
several other types of classifiers and apply model fine-tuning techniques to improve
their performance.
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